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NOTES AND COMMENTS

the life beneficiary of a non-spendthrift trust may reach his interest
by garnishment."
In Texas the Supreme Court held in G.H. and S.A.R.R. Co.
v. McDonald" that a proceeding by garnishment in behalf of a
judgment creditor is ordinarily intended to reach such rights,
credits, and effects only as are of a legal nature. As to interests
in property held in trust, the court said that a proceeding in equity
is the appropriate remedy.3"
Generally, the remedy of garnishment is regarded as summary and harsh, and the proceedings cannot be sustained unless
in strict conformity with statutory requirements.3 7 So long as Texas
courts are limited by the decision in the McDonald case, it is apparent that only legal interests can be reached and that the cestui's
equitable interest must be sought in some other type of proceeding." The appropriate proceedings in Texas appear to be levy
of execution or a creditor's bill seeking equitable execution.
Thomas B. Pennington.

PRECATORY TRUSTS

T

HERE are many cases where testators acting ill-advisedly
have used language whereby the courts have found difficulty
in determining whether or not the testators intended to charge
their devisees or legatees with a trust. Very commonly the difficulty
is caused by the use of precatory words. Precatory words are
words of desire or wish as distinguished from words of command,
and the purpose of this comment is to show how the early and
modern courts have treated this type of language in determining
Henderson v. Sunseri, 234 Ala. 289. 174 So. 767 (1937).
H. and S. A. R. R. Co. v. McDonald. 53 Tex. 510 (1880).
36 Clayton, Creditors Bills in Texas, 5 Trx. L. REv. 263. 271 (1927).
37 Beggs v. Fite. 130 Tex. 46. 106 S. W. (2d)
1039 (1937).
.1 Oglesby v. Dunr, 173 S. W. 275 (Tex. Civ. App., 1915) writ of error refused.
34

35G.
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whether or not a devisee took subject to equitable burdens. If a
court finds that a trust was created by such language, there has
arisen a precatory trust.'
By the early view courts dealt with the problem by finding
that a trust was created despite the precatory language used. Such
view was so prevalent that the English courts laid down a rule of
law that if a testator expressed a "desire" or "wish" that the devisee should make certain disposition of the property, then such
was to be treated as a trust, in the absence of any peculiar circumsances. In these cases precatory words were treated as creating
trusts when the courts did not know and where it was very doubtful
that the testator intended to impose upon the devisee such equitable
restrictions One of the limitations on the doctrine was that the
objects of the testator's bounty be sufficiently definite for judicial
enforcement. If the objects were uncertain, courts stated that a
trust could arise despite the precatory language used but that the
indefiniteness of the objects overcame the inference that a trust
was to be created.' Also, under this early view, the courts would
hold that no trust was created when the testator expressed a desire
that his devisee would dispose of all of his property for the benefit
of others, and not merely the property devised to him by the testator. The reason that the courts said that no trust was created was
that the testator could not impose a trust on any property except
that which he himself devised; therefore, it was to be inferred
that he did not intend to impose a trust upon any of the property.'
The modern English and American view seems to be that a
trust can be created by precatory words only when the testator
desires that the devisee make a particular disposition of the prop1 ScoTr ON TRusTs § 25 (1939).
2 Harding v. Glyn, 1 Atk. 469 (1739); Malim v. Keighley, 2 Ves. Jr. 333 (1794);
I ScoT oN TRUSTS § 25.1 (1939).
3 Harland v. Trigg, I Bro. C. C. 142 (1782); Stead v. Mellor. 5 Ch. D. 225 (1877).
Palmer v. Schribb, 2 Eq Cas. Abr. 291. pl. 9 (1713) ; Parnall v. Parnall, 9 Ch. D.
96 (1878); Trustees of Hillsdale College v. Wood, 145 Mich. 257. 108 N. W. 675
(1906); Springs v. Springs, 182 N. C. 484, 109 S. E. 839 (1921) ; Hopkins v. Glum
111 Pa 287. 2 At. 183 (1885) : 1 ScoTr oN TRusTs § 25.1 (1939).
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erty and an obligation is intended to be imposed upon him to make
the "desired" disposition. Under this view the courts find it much
more difficult to ascertain whether a trust was created than under
the early view because the courts must determine the testator's true
intention, and to do this much attention must be given to the entire
will or instrument of the particular case.'
Texas adopts the modern view which is expressed in the Restatement of Trusts. "No trust is created unless the settlor manifests an intention to impose enforceable duties." ' In Texas this
intention must be more mandatory than the mere desire or wish
of the settlor. The intention of the settlor must be to impose an
enforceable obligation on the devisee or legatee! In other words,
the devisee will get full title to the property devised if the objects
of the testator's "desire" or "wish" are uncertain, or where the
property subject to the precatory language is not sufficiently defined; or where the devisee has a clear discretion to act as he
thinks fit; or where the language of the devise vests the donee with
an absolute and unqualified ownership with only a suggestion that
the donor intended some limitation on the ownership!
As shown above, Texas does follow the Restatement of Trusts,
cases are not consistent as to when enforceable duties are
the
but
imposed. In Speairs v. Ligon9 a testator devised land to his wife
"requesting" that she dispose of the property at her death so as
to make the younger son an equal legatee with the other children.
The court held that the wife took absolute title to the land because
an absolute power of disposal was given to her. The testator did not
show a clear intention that his suggestion should be legally en5 Scort,

op. cit. supra note 1 at § 25.2. 155.
6RESTATn..NT, TRusTs § 25 (1935).
7 McMurray v. Stanley, 69 Tex. 227, 6 S. W. 412; Notes, 49 A.L.R. 10 (1927); 70
A.L.R. 326 (1931).
8 Johnson v. Bingham. 251 S. W. 529 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923), ai'd (Tex. Comm.
App. 1924) 265 S. W. 130, Opinion adopted Tex. Sup. Ct., 269 S. W. 1033; Autrey V.
Stubenrauch, 63 Tex. Civ. App. 247, 133 S. W. 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) writ of error
refused; See 42 TEx. Jutr.. Trusts § 18 (1932).
9 59 Tex. 233 (1883).
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forceable. The same result was reached in another case where the
testator devised the residue of his property to his wife "for her
to divide the amount due to each of the heirs as she in her judgment thought they were entitled to."' In Johnson v. Bingham" the
court held that no trust was created because the language was too
indefinite and unsatisfactory to create a trust and should therefore
be treated as merely suggestive. Despite these cases, Texas courts
have found a trust created by precatory language on the face when
it is expressed in a mandatory sense. In Norton v. Smith" a trust
was held to be created by the language, "It is my will that at her
death she will to our respective families whatever she may have
making an equal division thereof." The court said that looking at
the will in its entirety, the testator intended the words to be used
in a mandatory sense. Other trusts have been found to be created
by precatory language such as "I desire""3 and "it is my earnest
wish and desire."' "
There are no rigid rules to follow in the interpretation of
any will except to look at the entire will with a purpose to effectuate the true intention of its maker, and also consider the various
facts and circumstances surrounding the particular testator. It is a
commonplace that the same precatory words may convey different
meanings and interpretations in different contexts. And, of course,
different words may have distinctly different meanings. For example, the word "will" is a stronger word than "desire" or "wish,"
because it evidences the decision of mind that something is to be
done or foreborne and implies an intention on part of the testator
that the devisee should do particular things with the property. But
the word "desire" may be used interchangeably with the word
10 Weller v. Weller, 54 S. W. 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899).
11251 S. W. 529 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923), aff'd. 265 S. W. 130 (Tex. Comm. App.
1924), Opinion adopted Tex. Sup. Ct., modified 265 S. W. 884 (Tex.Comm. App. 1924),
Opinion adopted Tex. Sup. Ct., rev'd. in part 269 S. W. 1033 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925).
12 227 S. W. 542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) writ of error refused.
Is Arrington v. McDaniel, 14 S. W. (2d) 1009, (Tex. Comm. App. 1929), Drinkard
v. Hughes, 32 S. W. (2d) 935 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
14Alexander v. Thompson. 38 Tex. 533, (1873).
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"will," as a more courteous expression of the testator's intention;
therefore, whether these words are merely suggestive (precatory)
or mandatory must be determined from the particular instrument. 6
As pointed out at the beginning of this comment, testators
who have used precatory language in their wills have acted illadvisedly, because their true intention very probably cannot be
ascertained and carried out. To prevent such controversies from
arising, the testator, if he intended to create a trust, should use
expressly the words "trust" and "trustee" along with mandatory
instructions for his devisee to follow.
E. W. Parkhill.

L5See 44 T

. Jun., FiUs

161 (1932).

